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The Effects of Policies Concerning Teachers’ Wages  
on Students’ Performance 
 
Júlia Varga  
 
Abstract 
 
 
Using country panel data of student achievement from PISA, 2003-2012  combined 
with national-level teacher salary data from the OECD; this study investigates if 
relatively short term -5-years - changes in the level and structure of statutory teacher 
salaries affect student performance in the European countries. Our results show that 
there are marked differences between subjects and by the experience of teachers. 
Higher statutory teacher salaries and larger growth of teacher salaries at the first part 
of teachers’ career increase students’ maths and science performance, while the effect 
was less pronounced on reading performance and at the second part of teacher career. 
Nevertheless, the reason for the lack of the effect of teacher salaries at the second part 
of teachers’ career may be the result of the lack of data on teachers’ actual salaries. 
 
Keywords: teacher salaries, student performance, international, PISA, random effect, 
two-step method 
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A tanári bérek alakulásának hatása  
a tanulói teljesítményekre 
 
Varga Júlia 
 
Összefoglaló 
 
A tanulmány a 2003 és 2012 közötti PISA tanulói teljesítményméresek adataiból 
országszinten összekapcsolt panel adatbázis és OECD tanári bérekre vonatkozó 
adatgyűjtéseinek adatai segítségével azt vizsgálja, hogy a tanári bérek szinjének, és a 
tanári bérpálya alakjának viszonylag rövid távú (5 éves) változásai befolyásolják-e a 
tanulók teljesítményét az európai országokban. Az eredmények azt mutatják, hogy a 
hatás szignifikánsan különbözik kompetencia területek (olvasás-szövegértés, 
matematika, természettudomány) és a tanárok gyakorlati ideje szerint. A pályakezdő 
tanárok magasabb besorolás szerinti bére, és a tanári pálya első felében a besorolási 
bérek gyorsabb emelkedése a tanulók szignifikánsan jobb eredményeihez vezetnek 
matematikából és természettudományokból, míg nem találtunk szignifikáns hatást az 
olvasás-szövegértés eredményekre. Ugyancsaknem hatott szignifikánsan a tanulói 
teljesítményekre egyetlen kompetenciaterületen sem a tanárok besorolási bérének 
gyorsabb emelkedése a tanári életpálya második felében. A tanulmányban azt is 
bemutatjuk, hogy annak, hogy az életpálya második felében megfigyelhető 
bérnövekedésnek nincs hatása az lehet, hogy annak a következménye, hogy a béradatok 
a besorolási bérekre vonatkoznak, és nem állnak rendelkezésre a tanárok tényleges 
keresetére vonatkozó adatok. 
 
Tárgyszavak: tanári bérek, tanulói teljesítmények, PISA mérések, véletlen hatás 
modell, két lépcsős modell 
 
JEL kódok: I20, J31, J45, C23 
 
Köszönetnyilvánítás: A kutatást az NKFIH támogatta, azonosító: K 109338. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Improving students’ performance is an important objective in most countries.  
Although measurable information concerning teachers (gender, educational level, 
experience) does not correlate closely with students’ performance (Hanushek and 
Rivkin,  2006), a number of national level studies (e.g. Chetty, Friedman and Rokoff,  
2014; Darling-Hammond, 2000;  Rivkin, Hanushek and Kain, 2005) conducted using  
value-added models to evaluate teachers based on their impact on their students’ test 
scores suggest that teacher quality is one of the major determinants of student 
achievement. Many countries are facing teacher quality problems (Barbieri, Cipollone 
and Sestito 2008; Corcoran, Evans and Schwab, 2002; Lakdawalla, 2001; Leigh and 
Ryan, 2008; Neugebauer, 2015), and a common proposal is that teacher quality might 
be increased by means of teacher wage reforms. Higher pay is assumed to attract higher 
quality teachers to teaching and assist in retaining them.  
However, the results of national level studies on how teachers’ salaries are 
associated with students’ performance are mixed. On the one hand, some of the 
research findings suggest that evidence for salaries having an effect on students’ 
performance is lacking. For example, Hanushek and Rivkin (2006) summarize the 
results of more than a hundred studies on the effect of teacher salaries on student 
performance and find that only a minority of studies has found statistically significant 
results; nevertheless, the studies do show that salaries are more likely to be positively 
related to student achievement than negatively. Other studies claim that paying 
teachers more will not improve the quality of teachers very much, because a pay rise 
operates as a kind of negative feedback, helping to ensure that teachers of lower quality 
will stay on in the job longer after a salary increase (Ballou and Podgursky, 1995), or 
stress that teacher responses to alternative wages are less pronounced than the 
response in other jobs (Hanushek and Rivkin, 2006). Using a sharp geographical 
discontinuity in teacher salary scales in England, Greaves and Sibieta (2014) find little 
evidence that higher teacher salaries have a positive impact on pupil attainment.  Ree, 
Muralidharan, Pradhan and Rogers (2015) present experimental evidence from 
Indonesian schools that the doubling in teachers’ pay led, in the following two or three 
years, to no improvements in student learning outcomes. 
Another section of the research suggests that the quality of education can be 
improved by raising teacher salaries (e.g. Loeb and Page, 2000; Murnane and Olsen, 
1990). These studies show that teachers with high opportunity costs, that is, those who 
have better labour market opportunities outside of teaching, stay in teaching for a 
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shorter time (Dolton 2010; Dolton and van der Klaauw 1999; Murnane and Olsen, 
1990), as also that wage differentials between those professions outside of teaching and 
teachers’ wages affect teachers’ decisions to exit teaching (Gilpin, 2011; Imazeki, 2005; 
Krieg, 2006; Ondrich, Pas and Yinger, 2008). It has also been shown that higher 
teacher salaries retain and attract more effective teachers (Hendricks, 2014). Results 
also suggest that novice teachers are most responsive to changes in salary, both in 
terms of retention and selection effects (e.g. Gilpin, 2011). The main difficulty of 
national level studies is that on a country level there is limited exogenous variation in 
teacher salaries as teachers’ pay is usually set by national agreements, and the variation 
in salaries tend to reflect differences in teachers’ education, experience or costs in the 
local area (see Hanushek and Rivkin, 2006). Using international variation for the 
identification of effects of teacher salaries can help alleviate this problem, although 
there are concerns about the use of cross-country data, too, such as omitted variables 
bias and other constraints (see Hanushek and Woessmann, 2010). In fact, there are 
very few studies concerning the question of how international differences in 
educational achievement are related to teacher salaries.  
In a study that investigates the role of teacher cognitive skills on students’ 
performance, comparing different countries, Hanushek, Piopiunik and Wiederhold 
(2014) attempt to estimate whether teachers’ cognitive skills are higher in countries 
that pay teachers relatively better wages. Their results indicate that higher relative 
teacher pay is systematically related to higher teacher skills; nevertheless, they 
emphasize that the estimates are not causal estimates of how the quality of teachers 
would change if teacher salaries were raised.  Carnoy, Beteille, Brodziak, Loyalka and 
Luschei (2009) compared the salaries of primary and secondary school teachers with 
the salaries of people in mathematics-oriented professions, such as engineering and 
various scientific fields, and found that in countries where teachers are paid more 
relative to salaries in competing professions, students do better in mathematics 
knowledge tests. Based on Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) 
2006 data on student science performance and OECD teacher salary data, Boarini and 
Lüdemann (2009) employed a multi-level analysis on the sample of OECD countries, 
and found that teachers’ wages are associated with higher PISA performance. 
Woessmann (2011) combined country performance-pay measurements with PISA-
2003 achievement data, and estimated international education production functions at 
the student level using alternative measures of the control variable for teacher salary 
levels. He found that teacher performance pay is significantly positively related to 
achievement in maths, science, and reading achievement between countries. 
Employing Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) and PISA 
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assessment test data, Dolton and Marcenaro-Gutierrez (2011) constructed a composite 
measure of students’ performance for 8th grade students (a standardised score for each 
type of assessment) and, merging the data with OECD data for teacher salaries  
between 1995 and 2006, constructed a country panel data-set. Based on this panel 
data-set they then investigated the determinants of teachers’ salaries across countries, 
and also whether absolute and relative teacher pay in a given country had an impact on 
pupil performance. They found that both absolute and relative levels of teacher salaries 
exert an important influence on pupil performance. Unlike most other studies, which 
relate current teacher salaries to current student performance, Dolton and Marcenaro-
Gutierrez use average salaries of primary, lower secondary and upper secondary 
teachers between 1995 and 2006 and their overall wage growth in the same period. As 
the quality distribution of the current stock of teachers is the result of both past and 
current salaries, this method might be more reliable than just using current salaries for 
measuring teachers’ quality. Nevertheless, a 12-year period might mask different 
periods of growth and decline in teacher salaries which might, in turn, have an impact 
on the decision to become a teacher and on the rate of teacher attrition. Dolton and 
Marceno-Gutierrez also emphasize that not only average relative wages in teaching are 
important in the question of teacher supply, but that both the pattern of teacher 
salaries and the age-earning profile of teachers also play important roles. They use 
average teacher starting salaries, the salaries of those with 15 years’ experience, and 
maximum salaries separately in different models in their attempt to capture this effect.  
This study investigates how relatively short term changes in the level and structure 
of teacher salaries affect student performance. Our work is closely related to the Dolton 
and Marcenaro-Gutierrez study; it differs, however, in several respects. First, in this 
study, it is the relatively short-term (5 years) implications of changes in relative 
earnings or changes in the shape of the age-earning profiles of teachers that are at the 
centre of the investigation. This may be of interest from a policy-making perspective, as 
it is usually assumed that it takes a very long time to change the overall quality of the 
whole stock of teachers completely, because in the case of a salary increase, the quality 
of new recruits would rise, but the quality of existing teachers would not change, and 
the rise would act as an incentive for the latter group to stay in the job longer. Second, 
the analysis only considers European countries, assuming that the effect of teacher 
wages will be relatively homogenous for countries at a similar stage of economic 
development and with similar traditions of education.  Finally, we analyze the wage-
effect separately for reading, maths and science performance, in order to investigate if 
there are differences between subjects.  
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Between 1999 and 2013 there were great differences between countries in the 
changes of relative earnings of teachers (Figure A1). In some countries, there were 
distinct periods of salary increase and decrease (e.g. Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Germany) while in other countries the relative salary of teachers declined continuously 
(e.g. Greece, Spain), or was constant over the whole period (e.g. Italy, Slovak Republic, 
Sweden). Furthermore, the shape of the age-earnings profile remained constant in 
some countries (e.g. Belgium, Denmark), while in others it changed (e.g. Portugal, 
Poland) (Figure 2). This already might also have an effect in the short run, because as a 
consequence of these changes teachers at different points on the age-experience profile 
could receive different incentives to stay in teaching or leave the profession. Our study 
analyzes the wage-effect separately in different subjects (literacy, mathematics, and 
science). Many national-level studies have demonstrated that in some subject areas 
there is an over-supply of teachers while in others, there is a lack of qualified teachers 
(e.g. Boyd, Grossman, Lankford, Loeb and Wyckoff 2006; Hanushek, 2007). With 
regard to teaching labour market opportunities, opportunity wages are different for 
teachers in different subject areas. Usually, teacher shortages are most pronounced in 
maths and the sciences, in those subjects where alternative wages are usually higher. As 
salary scales do not differ according to teachers’ subject-specialisation, changes in 
teacher salaries might have different effects in subject areas. 
DATA  
For the analysis, data from four waves of the Programme for International Student 
Assessment (PISA) and 14 waves (1999-2012) of the OECD Educational at a Glance 
(EAG) data were used. PISA measures three different types of literacy: reading, 
mathematics, and science at the age of 15 every 3 years since 2000.  A two-step 
sampling procedure ensures that student samples are representative of the relevant 
populations. First, schools in which 15-year-olds are studying are selected (schools are 
sampled with probabilities proportional to the number of 15-year-olds enrolled), then, 
a subset of students is sampled in each selected school. PISA data include students’ test 
scores and also provide information on students’ family background, and on the 
characteristics of schools. The school questionnaire is filled in by school principals, so 
the answers reflect these principals’ views on different features of school functioning. 
The EAG data provide detailed information on the education systems of the OECD and 
partner countries. It contains information on teacher salaries too. Since 1999, the 
OECD has collected comparable data on statutory salaries at three points in time: 
starting salary, salary with 15 years’ experience and top salary by ISCED (International 
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Standard Classification of Education) levels. We also know from EAG data how many 
years it takes to reach the top statutory salary. It worth emphasizing that our salary 
data refer to the statutory salaries of teachers, and not the actual salaries. Although the 
OECD has also recently begun collecting data on actual teacher salaries, these data are 
available only for the most recent years and on only for a few, although growing 
number of countries. That’s why – similar to all previous studies – analyzing the effect 
of teachers’ salaries on student performance with the help of EAG data - we could not 
use data on actual salaries. In the conclusion section, we return to this question and 
summarize how this might affect our results. Furthermore, EAG data provide 
information on the proportion of women teachers and the age distribution of teachers. 
We also used EAG data for per capita GDP of the countries in the sample. 
In order to construct our data-set we first combined students’ test scores in maths, 
science, and reading literacy with individual students’ characteristics, family 
background information, and school-level data for each of the four PISA waves. We 
then constructed a country-level panel dataset from the four waves (2003, 2006, 2009, 
and 2012) of the PISA data. These data were then merged with country-level variables 
for teacher salaries and teacher characteristics. Finally, data from the full PISA sample 
were completed with countries’ GDP per capita, based on EAG data. 
For the country level variables we used 5-year averages, that is, we merged the t 
year PISA data with the averages of the given year and the preceding 4 years’ EAG 
country level data.  The reason for this method was rooted in the concept that behind 
teacher salaries potentially having an effect on students’ performance lies the fact that 
salaries have an effect on teacher quality, via the mechanism of teachers’ self-selection 
into teaching. Nevertheless, teachers’ or potential teachers’ response to salaries and 
salary changes requires time to become apparent.  The current stock of teachers at any 
time is shaped by the effects of both past and current salaries. Teacher pay exhibits a 
cyclical pattern in many countries (e.g. Chevalier, Dolton, McIntosh, 2007; Varga, 
2014; Wolter and Denzler, 2004) where a period of decline of teachers’ relative salaries 
is followed by a large increase, which is then followed by a  fresh decline in teachers’ 
relative salaries. So relative salaries for a longer period, and not just for a single year 
may better reflect the real position of teachers.  
In order to minimize differences in economic development, the group of countries 
in the sample was restricted to EU countries, and only selected observations from 
countries which participated in at least three of the five waves of PISA. Our final sample 
consists of 708,856 individuals, 23 countries and 75 country/year observations 
(countries in the sample are presented in Appendix Table A1). 
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METHODS 
The analysis is based on an education production function framework. In their simplest 
form, the models estimated can be represented as follows: 
                   (1) 
Where Yict is the test score of an individual i in a country c at a time t.  F contains 
variables that summarise individual level characteristics, while Tct contains variables 
summarising country-level teacher salaries and other country-level characteristics. 
There are also unobserved individual effects εcti and country effects uct . 
Our database is of a hierarchical nature, the individual level observations are 
embedded in the higher, country level, and so multilevel modeling methods were used 
to analyze the effect of teachers’ salary structure on students’ performance. 
Nevertheless, our data contains a very large sample of individuals within each country, 
though from a small number of countries, so the main difficulty in this analysis was to 
provide robust conclusions about the effects of country-level characteristics on 
students’ performance. A large number of individual-level observations and a small 
number of countries is a common problem of studies which try to explain differences in 
socio-economic outcomes across countries (Bryan and Jenkins, 2015).  To deal with 
this problem, we used different model specifications for the analysis.  
For reference purposes, first, we pooled the data of the four waves and used OLS 
regressions. This approach ignores the fact that individuals within a country share 
unobserved characteristics, so cluster-robust (country) standard errors were used to 
allow for a more general correlation structure between individuals within countries.  
The second specification used country random effect models because our focus is 
on the effects of country-level predictors and we put in our models time-invariant 
country-level variables too. 
Finally a two-step method was used, in which the first step is a regression at the 
individual level and the second another regression at the country/year level. In the first 
step we estimate: 
(2) 
Where, v is the regression intercept, which combines both observed and 
unobserved country characteristics. Then, with the help of the second step OLS 
regression we analysed the country-specific components: 
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                                            (3) 
Where,    are the intercepts from the first-step country/year separate regressions 
and   is a residual error term. The effects of country-level characteristics are 
estimated from only C observations, so their standard errors will typically be relatively 
large. 
First our models were estimated using only individual and country level variables, 
then we repeated the estimations, complementing the models with school-level 
variables too.  A large body of literature confirms that teachers are not randomly 
assigned to schools (e.g. Rivkin, Hanushek, Kain, 2005; Rockoff, 2004).  School-level 
characteristics were chosen that may have an effect on the sorting of teacher quality 
between schools and thus may alter student performance so that it is above or below 
average.  
The models were estimated separately for the performance of the students in 
mathematics, reading and science because  outside of teaching, salaries and the labour 
market opportunities for teachers of different subjects are heterogeneous, and thus 
may have differing impacts on teacher selection and quality.   
Our individual level variables include gender, age, a variable indicating if the 
individual student is an immigrant (was born in another county), another variable 
indicating if one or both parents of the student are immigrants, dummy variables 
indicating the highest educational attainment of the student’s mother and father. To 
describe teacher sorting at the school-level the following covariates were used:  whether 
the school the student was studying in was a private school; the proportion of fully 
qualified teachers in the school; if there was a teacher shortage at school in the opinion 
of the school principal; the type of settlement the school was operating in (large city, 
city, town, small town versus village); the proportion of immigrant students at school; 
the  proportion of girls at school; whether the  school had responsibility for the 
determination of salaries (beginning salaries, salary increases, or both); and whether 
the school had responsibility for the hiring or firing of teachers, or both.  
In order to analyze the effect of teachers’ salaries, four variables describing the age-
earning profile of teachers were used: starting salary as proportion of GDP per capita, 
the growth of salaries from starting to 15th year of experience, the growth of salaries 
from 15th year of experience to the top salary, and the number of years needed to reach 
the top salary year. For all variables describing relative salaries of teachers and 
teachers’ age-earnings profiles,  5-year averages were used, for the reasons summarized 
in the previous section. Although the salaries of teachers relative to other graduate 
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salaries would have been a better measure of teachers’ relative position and outside 
teaching opportunities than salaries as a proportion of per capita GDP, the latter 
measure was used because of the lack of available, longitudinal data for the first 
measure. However, salaries as a proportion of per capita GDP can illustrate how 
teacher salaries stand relative to the country’s economic wealth.  We also controlled for 
country level GDP per capita in equivalent US dollars (using PPP). The proportion of 
women teachers was a further country level variable in our models. We also put a 
dummy variable in our models indicating whether the country is a central or eastern 
European country (CEE) or not in order to analyze whether there were systematic 
differences between CEE and non-CEE countries. The reason why there might have 
been systematic differences between the two groups was that in the countries of the 
former Soviet Bloc, selection into teaching –for the older age cohorts who graduated 
under the old regime – was very different from that found in non-CEE countries.  In 
the CEE countries, until the end of the 90s the number of higher education places was 
very restricted, and higher education – including teacher training – was more 
competitive than in the non-CEE countries, in spite of the relatively low salaries of 
teachers in the CEE countries (Kogan, 2008). That’s why we expect systematic 
differences in teacher quality for the older age cohorts between these two groups of 
countries. 
RESULTS 
The Effect of Statutory Teachers’ Salaries on Student performance 
 
Table 1 summarizes the results of the models for the performance of students in 
mathematics /according to different model specifications; Table 2 shows the results for 
science performance and Table 3 reading performance. (Summary statistics are 
presented in the (Appendix, Table A1). 
Marked differences in the effect of salaries on student performance are to be found 
in different subjects. Higher starting salaries increase maths and science performance 
but not literacy performance.  Statutory starting salaries for teachers have a significant 
positive effect on students’ maths and science performance with all model 
specifications.  As for reading performance, the results are mixed; there are some 
specifications in which a positive relationship between teachers’ starting salaries and 
students’ reading performance could be found, but in the case of the majority of 
specifications, no effect was to be found.  
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Table 1.  
Determinants of student performance in maths 
MATHS 
Variable 
Pooled 
sample 
OLS 
Panel 
Rando
m 
Two–
Step 
Method 
Pooled 
sample 
OLS 
Panel 
Rando
m 
Effect 
Two–
Step 
Method 
   1
st step 
Country/ 
Year 
  1
st step 
Country/ 
Year 
Individual level 
variables 
  
  
Gender (Male) 
11.77* 
(1.266) 
11.27* 
(1.190) 
Yes 16.06* 
(2.096) 
14.94* 
(1.529) 
Yes 
Age 
18.13* 
(1.916) 
16.28* 
(1.257) 
Yes 16.82* 
(2.419) 
14.87* 
(1.777) 
Yes 
Immigrant student 
-36.98* 
(7.155) 
-38.61* 
(8.306) 
Yes -35.35* 
(7.054) 
-38.10* 
(8.248) 
Yes 
One or both parents 
immigrant 
-13.85 
(5.491) 
-11.51 
(6.070) 
Yes -14.85 
(6.936) 
-11.51 
(6.012) 
Yes 
Mother’s educational 
attainment upper 
secondary (ISCED 
3/4) 
29.03* 
(2.518) 
24.77* 
(1.872) 
Yes 
27.09* 
(2.532) 
23.85* 
(1.901) 
Yes 
Mother’s educational 
attainment tertiary 
(ISCED 5/6) 
43.87* 
(3.531) 
39.03* 
(3.296) 
Yes 
41.53* 
(3.844) 
36.85* 
(3.391) 
Yes 
Father’s educational 
attainment upper 
secondary (ISCED 
3/4) 
24.33* 
(1.608) 
20.83* 
(1.542) 
Yes 
23.65* 
(1.872) 
20.61* 
(1.537) 
Yes 
Father’s educational 
attainment tertiary 
(ISCED 5/6) 
44.05* 
(2.862) 
39.26* 
(3.728) 
Yes 
41.99* 
(3.117) 
37.60* 
(3.546) 
Yes 
School-level variables 
   
  
 
Private school 
- - No 13.16** 
(3.790) 
12.96 
(5.426) 
Yes 
Proportion of fully 
certified teachers 
- - No 15.20 
(6.734) 
6.83 
(7.569) 
Yes 
Teacher shortage at 
school 
- - No -5.96 
(2.208) 
-4.31 
(2.474) 
Yes 
School in small town 
- - No 12.90* 
(3.416) 
9.33** 
(3.132) 
Yes 
School in town 
- - No 20.01* 
(5.146) 
15.34* 
(4.170) 
Yes 
School in city 
- - No 21.55* 
(4.285) 
17.12* 
(3.941) 
Yes 
School in large city 
- - No 21.60 
(9.096) 
21.49** 
(7.083) 
Yes 
School has 
responsibility for 
determining salaries 
- - No 
-0.72 
(2.420) 
0.31 
(3.808) 
Yes 
School has 
responsibility for 
- - No 0.07 
(2.893) 
1.94 
(3.357) 
Yes 
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hiring/firing 
Proportion of 
immigrant students at 
school 
- - No 
-79.84 
(44.18) 
-22.72 
(39.563) 
Yes 
Proportion of girls at 
school 
- - No 36.57 
(16.81) 
27.99 
(9.349) 
Yes 
Country-level  
variables 
 2nd step 
 
 
2nd step 
 
Proportion of women 
teachers 
-0.24 
(0.323) 
0.09 
(0.927) 
-0.26 
(0.257) 
-0.23 
(0.341) 
0.20 
(0.448) 
-0.45 
(0.348) 
GDP per capita in 
equivalent US dollars 
(using PPP) 
0.00 
(0.000) 
-0.00 
(0.001) 
0.00 
(0.000) 
0.00*** 
(0.000) 
0.00 
(0.000) 
0.00 
(0.000) 
Starting salary as 
proportion of GDP 
per capita 
49.23* 
(11.067) 
34.09** 
(12.257) 
36.14* 
(9.62) 
49.39* 
(13.016) 
39.34** 
(13.172) 
38.61** 
(12.753) 
Years to top salary 
-0.60 
(0.256) 
0.27 
(1.113) 
-0.55 
(0.216) 
-0.81 
(0.292) 
-0.46 
(0.269) 
-0.70 
(0.282) 
Growth of salaries 
from starting to 15 
years’ experience 
45.59* 
(10.334) 
14.24 
(23.665) 
28.07*** 
(10.800) 
32.26*** 
(11.011) 
16.34 
(14.642) 
36.51*** 
(14.491) 
Growth of salaries 
from 15 years’ 
experience to top 
63.62* 
(17.111) 
0.94 
(27.092) 
0.50 
(0.516) 
60.04* 
(16.221) 
33.06 
(13.727) 
-0.14 
(0.701) 
CEE country 
32.84** 
(9.572) 
-9.72 
(22.300) 
11.110 
(8.091) 
41.17** 
(12.275) 
31.53 
(12.666) 
36.20* 
(10.23) 
Year 2006 
-11.67** 
(3.375) 
-2.01 
(3.563) 
No 
 
-10.30 
(4.357) 
-11.42*** 
(4.422) 
No 
 
Year 2009 
-16.92 
(6.744) 
1.09 
(8.468) 
No -13.31 
(9.619) 
-21.15*** 
(7.966) 
No 
Year 2012 
-17.84 
(8.870) 
3.44 
(12.304) 
No -19.47 
(10.787) 
-27.10*** 
(10.400) 
No 
Constant 
-41.96 
(72.426) 
169.93 
(106.712) 
-56.48 
(31.732) 
-53.35 
(85.640) 
47.45 
(71.542) 
-74.45 
(45.373) 
*Significant at the 1 per cent level; **Significant at the 5 per cent level; ***Significant at 
the 10 per cent level 
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Table 2.   
Determinants of students’ science performance 
SCIENCE 
 
Variable 
Pooled 
sampl
e 
OLS 
Panel 
Rando
m 
Effect 
Two –
Step 
Method 
Pooled 
sample 
OLS 
Panel 
Random 
Effect 
Two –
Step 
Method 
   1
st step 
Countr
y/Year 
  1
st step 
Country/
Year 
Individual level 
variables 
  
  
Gender (Male) 
3.04 
(1.349) 
1.83*** 
(1.008) 
Yes 8.06* 
(1.876) 
6.37* 
(1.466) 
Yes 
Age 
18.75* 
(1.519) 
17.17* 
(1.337) 
Yes 17.56* 
(1.789) 
15.01* 
(1.945) 
Yes 
Immigrant student 
-42.57* 
(7.486) 
-41.21* 
(7.092) 
Yes -41.55* 
(7.598) 
-41.65* 
(7.201) 
Yes 
One or both 
parents immigrant 
-16.54 
(6.585) 
-12.47 
(5.823) 
Yes -18.70 
(8.417) 
-13.48 
(6.278) 
Yes 
Mother’s 
educational 
attainment upper 
secondary (ISCED 
3/4) 
32.16* 
(2.517) 
26.83* 
(2.172) 
Yes 
30.42* 
(2.638) 
26.48* 
(2.058) 
Yes 
Mother’s 
educational 
attainment tertiary 
(ISCED 5/6) 
48.22* 
(3.608) 
41.89* 
(3.290) 
Yes 
45.73* 
(4.039) 
40.32* 
(3.639) 
Yes 
Father’s 
educational 
attainment upper 
secondary (ISCED 
3/4) 
26.71* 
(2.237) 
22.05* 
(1.873) 
Yes 
25.93* 
(2.508) 
21.47* 
(1.793) 
Yes 
Father’s 
educational 
attainment tertiary 
(ISCED 5/6) 
47.52* 
(3.282) 
40.64* 
(3.964) 
Yes 
44.83* 
(3.676) 
38.16* 
(3.858) 
Yes 
School-level 
variables 
   
  
 
Private school 
- - No 10.07 
(4.231) 
10.62* 
(3.104) 
Yes 
Proportion of fully 
certified teachers 
- - No 22.41*** 
(7.687) 
14.84 
(6.052) 
Yes 
Teacher shortage 
at school 
- - No -5.29 
(2.088) 
-4.24 
(2.414) 
Yes 
School in small 
town 
- - No 12.44** 
(3.552) 
7.94** 
(2.924) 
Yes 
School in town 
- - No 18.81** 
(5.666) 
14.26* 
(4.093) 
Yes 
School in city 
- - No 22.03* 
(4.907) 
18.55* 
(4.065) 
Yes 
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School in large city 
- - No 23.36 
(9.733) 
24.40* 
(6.044) 
Yes 
School has 
responsibility for 
determining 
salaries 
- - No 
4.20 
(2.335) 
5.30 
(2.647) 
Yes 
School has 
responsibility for 
hiring/firing 
- - No 
-2.60 
(2.934) 
-1.81 
(3.204) 
Yes 
Proportion of 
immigrant 
students at school 
- - No 
-46.06 
(30.458) 
-12.17 
(29.401) 
Yes 
Proportion of girls 
at school 
- - No 46.65*** 
(16.202) 
37.84* 
(8.619) 
Yes 
Country-level  
variables 
 2nd step 
 
 
2nd step 
 
Proportion of 
women teachers 
0.44 
(0.383) 
-0.27 
(0.787) 
0.61 
(0.299) 
0.32 
(0.394) 
0.69 
(0.464) 
0.53 
(0.421) 
GDP per capita in 
equivalent US 
dollars (using PPP) 
0.00 
(0.000) 
0.00 
(0.000) 
0.00 
(0.000) 
0.00 
(0.000) 
0.00 
(0.000) 
0.00* 
(0.000) 
Starting salary as 
proportion of GDP 
per capita 
52.02** 
(14.156) 
44.81*** 
(26.774) 
45.81* 
(9.519) 
49.75** 
(15.638) 
30.34** 
(13.95) 
50.80* 
(13.253) 
Years to top salary 
-0.62 
(0.282) 
-0.05 
(0.771) 
-0.32 
(0.251) 
-0.83*** 
(0.289) 
-0.45 
(0.309) 
-0.47 
(0.351) 
Growth of salaries 
from starting to 15 
years’ experience 
36.41**
* 
(11.976) 
22.95 
(23.541) 
31.22** 
(10.851) 
24.91*** 
(11.884) 
14.62 
(14.855) 
40.50*** 
(15.800) 
Growth of salaries 
from 15 years’ 
experience to top 
48.38 
(21.644
) 
10.45 
(24.934) 
0.39 
(0.502) 
48.14 
(22.519) 
34.75 
(19.106) 
-0.36 
(0.798) 
CEE country 
24.34 
(10.300
) 
26.90 
(21.281) 
13.31 
(7.623) 
31.25*** 
(11.036) 
20.39 
(11.445) 
38.93* 
(10.609) 
Year 2006 
-7.78 
(3.125) 
-2.11 
(5.328) No 
-5.54 
(3.477) 
-5.39 
(4.580) 
No 
 
Year 2009 
-13.70 
(5.981) 
-4.20 
(7.322) 
No -10.47 
(6.707) 
-15.34 
(6.670) 
No 
Year 2012 
-13.33 
(8.130) 
-1.91 
(9.479) 
No -14.23 
(8.290) 
-17.88 
(8.768) 
No 
Constant 
-50.33 
(77.560
) 
110.30 
(109.676) 
-159.47 
(31.95) 
-70.65 
(76.627) 
27.41 
(71.870) 
-193.64 
(48.754) 
*Significant at the 1 per cent level; **Significant at the 5 per cent level; ***Significant at 
the 10 per cent level 
 
The shape of the age-earnings profile, the growth of teachers’ salaries at the 
beginning of their career, that is, from starting to the 15th year of experience, seems to 
have an effect on students’ maths and science performance, although the effect was not 
significant at all model specifications. In the course of the second part of teachers’ 
careers (from the 15th years of experience to the top), the shape of the age-earnings 
profile seems to have no significant effect on students’ maths performance. The effect is 
positive on students’ science performance, but again, we could not find a significant 
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effect in the course of the second part of teachers’ careers. The years from the 15th year 
up to the top salary does not seem to influence students’ science performance, either. 
Table 3.  
Determinants of students’ reading performance 
READING 
Variable 
Pooled 
sample 
OLS 
Panel 
Rando
m 
Effect 
Two –
Step 
Metho
d 
Pooled 
sample 
OLS 
Panel 
Random 
Effect 
Two –
Step 
Method 
   1
st step 
Count
ry/Ye
ar 
  1
st step 
Country/
Year Individual level 
variables 
  
  
Gender (Male) 
-37.63* 
(2.075) 
-38.52* 
(1.626) 
Yes -32.31* 
(2.032) 
-33.35* 
(1.768) 
Yes 
Age 
17.68* 
(1.33) 
16.04* 
(1.134) 
Yes 17.78* 
(1.923) 
14.49* 
(1.599) 
Yes 
Immigrant student 
-39.48* 
(7.070) 
-39.16* 
(7.206) 
Yes -39.43* 
(7.156) 
-39.67* 
(7.119) 
Yes 
One or both 
parents immigrant 
-11.38 
(5.317) 
-8.69 
(5.253) 
Yes -13.67 
(6.632) 
-10.52 
(5.333) 
Yes 
Mother’s 
educational 
attainment upper 
secondary (ISCED 
3/4) 
31.75* 
(2.892) 
25.98* 
(2.166) 
Yes 
29.85* 
(3.015) 
25.03* 
(1.868) 
Yes 
Mother’s 
educational 
attainment tertiary 
(ISCED 5/6) 
46.44* 
(3.563) 
39.90* 
(3.030) 
Yes 
43.75* 
(3.814) 
37.67* 
(3.036) 
Yes 
Father’s 
educational 
attainment upper 
secondary (ISCED 
3/4) 
25.46* 
(1.920) 
21.83* 
(1.544) 
Yes 
24.93* 
(2.110) 
21.08* 
(1.503) 
Yes 
Father’s 
educational 
attainment tertiary 
(ISCED 5/6) 
43.74* 
(2.691) 
39.41* 
(3.384) 
Yes 
41.38* 
(3.031) 
36.60* 
(3.374) 
Yes 
School-level 
variables 
   
  
 
Private school 
- - No 12.64** 
(3.689) 
13.82* 
(3.701) 
Yes 
Proportion of fully 
certified teachers 
- - No 23.31*** 
(8.009) 
18.35*** 
(7.065) 
Yes 
Teacher shortage 
at school 
- - No -6.36 
(2.343) 
-4.85 
(2.504) 
Yes 
School in small 
town 
- - No 12.59* 
(3.110) 
8.25* 
(2.591) 
Yes 
School in town 
- - No 20.62* 
(5.315) 
16.03* 
(3.820) 
Yes 
School in city 
- - No 24.65* 
(4.556) 
20.74* 
(3.858) 
Yes 
School in large city 
- - No 26.94 
(9.665) 
29.27* 
(6.056) 
Yes 
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School has 
responsibility for 
determining 
salaries 
- - No 
-4.30 
(1.976) 
-1.58 
(3.253) 
Yes 
School has 
responsibility for 
hiring/firing 
- - No 
-2.78 
(2.693) 
-0.75 
(3.003) 
Yes 
Proportion of 
immigrant 
students at school 
- - No 
-54.77 
(35.836) 
-0.96 
(28.368) 
Yes 
Proportion of girls 
at school 
- - No 51.47** 
(15.219) 
44.55* 
(11.066) 
Yes 
Country-level  
variables 
 2nd 
step 
  
2nd step 
 
Proportion of 
women teachers 
-0.12 
(0.257) 
0.43 
(0.639) 
0.44 
(0.198) 
-0.21 
(0.288) 
0.38 
(0.321) 
0.41 
(0.316) 
GDP per capita in 
equivalent US 
dollars (using PPP) 
0.00 
(0.000) 
-0.00 
(0.000) 
0.00 
(0.000) 
0.00 
(0.000) 
0.00 
(0.000) 
0.00* 
(0.000) 
Starting salary as 
proportion of GDP 
per capita 
27.63*** 
(10.12) 
13.20 
(17.205) 
22.96** 
(7.802) 
23.89 
(12.690) 
14.22 
(9.061) 
28.71 
(11.317) 
Years to top salary 
-0.67 
(0.255) 
-0.59 
(0.608) 
-0.25 
(0.191) 
-0.97* 
(0.265) 
-0.41 
(0.227) 
-0.36 
(0.303) 
Growth of salaries 
from starting to 15 
years’experience 
31.56 
(8.888) 
3.19 
(15.971) 
30.74* 
(8.534) 
19.20 
(8.265) 
17.52 
(9.803) 
35.19*** 
(13.878) 
Growth of salaries 
from 15 years’ 
experience to top 
50.52*** 
(16.171) 
-12.74 
(24.106) 
0.68 
(0.492) 
53.25** 
(16.03) 
23.99 
(11.826) 
-0.022 
(0.699) 
CEE country 
5.31 
(9.308) 
-34.49 
(16.156) 
-4.08 
(6.265) 
12.83 
(10.651) 
3.328 
(9.149) 
17.66 
(9.82) 
Year 2006 
-7.13 
(3.504) 
-3.96 
(3.203) No 
-6.09 
(3.976) 
-9.57** 
(3.424) 
No 
 
Year 2009 
-5.79 
(4.680) 
3.79 
(5.491) 
No -5.99 
(7.124) 
-15.67** 
(5.649) 
No 
Year 2012 
2.43 
(6.452) 
11.79 
(7.452) 
No -2.53 
(8.191) 
-14.49 
(6.910) 
No 
Constant 
68.90 
(58.543) 
262.15* 
(67.279) 
-110.94 
(23.851
) 
24.31 
(74.203) 
98.17 
(48.333) 
-140.68 
(38.294) 
*Significant at the 1 per cent level; **Significant at the 5 per cent level; ***Significant at 
the 10 per cent level 
 
Not only did statutory starting salaries prove to have no impact on students’ 
reading performance, but neither did the other three indicators describing teachers’ 
age-earning profile (even though some estimations resulted in significant effects). 
Depending on the model specification, the level of GDP per capita either does not 
have a significant effect on students’ performance or has a significant zero effect. The 
results of the estimations of some model specifications show that students in Central 
and Eastern European countries display better performance in maths and science, but 
the results are not consistent across model specifications. 
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Nearly all student-level variables are significant, with some exceptions. There are 
gender differences in students’ performance by subjects, while in general older students 
perform better, and the higher the educational level of the student’s parents the better 
the student’s performance is. The first generation immigrant students (those born in 
another country) do worse than their schoolmates who were born in the same country, 
though there is no difference between the performance of students whose mother or 
father or both were born in another country and students whose parents are not 
immigrants.  Many of the school-level variables are insignificant, but there are some 
notable exceptions. Private school students do better as well as students in schools 
located in larger settlements. The maths and reading performance of the students is 
better if the proportion of girls is larger in the school. The reading performance of 
students increases as the proportion of fully certified teachers increases in their school. 
Variables indicating whether the school has responsibility for the hiring/firing of 
teachers or for determining teachers’ salaries proved to be insignificant if controlled for 
the level and growth of teacher salaries and other variables. 
In view of the aims of this analysis, the most important result would have been if 
teachers’ statutory starting salaries had been higher in the preceding five years and 
students’ performance in maths and science had also been higher, but no such effect 
was to be observed on reading performance.   The another important finding of the 
analysis is that the shape of the earnings profile in the preceding five years has no effect 
on students’ performance. There might be different reasons for the variation of results 
across subjects. The most plausible explanation is that the differences reflect the 
differences in the labour market options for maths, science, and other teachers. Several 
studies have proved that the average wage return on a mathematics degree is higher 
than for many other subjects (e.g. Walker and Zhu, 2001), that quantitative fields (e.g. 
science, maths) increase employment probability and earnings (e.g. Buonanno and 
Pozzoli, 2009). Science and maths teachers seem to adapt to relative salary changes 
more flexibly than other teachers, thanks to better labour market opportunities. 
A further explanation might be that as students’ performance at any point in time 
reflects not only current and recent teacher quality, but also the effect of past teachers, 
current performance reflects the accumulated knowledge of students over the years. 
There might be differences between different skills in relation to how much time is 
needed to achieve improvements in student skills. If an improvement in the maths and 
science knowledge of students can be achieved within a shorter period than the 
improvement in literacy skills, then the effects of increasing teacher quality will only be 
observed after a longer period. 
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The next section summarises possible reasons for the analysis failing to find any 
effect due to the age-earning profile of teachers, particularly in the second part of their 
careers. 
Statutory and Actual Salaries 
 
 Our results concerning starting salaries and the growth of salaries in the first part of 
teachers’ careers (from their starting salary to that of teachers with 15 years’ 
experience) were in line with those of previous research findings (e.g. Dolton and 
Marcenaro-Gutierrez, 2011). We found that the larger teachers’ starting salaries and the 
larger the growth of their salaries at the beginning of their careers are, the better 
students’ maths and science performance is. Nevertheless, we could not find a 
significant effect of the salary growth of teachers from the 15th year of experience to the 
top, nor did the number of years required to reach top salaries seem to have any effect. 
These results may reflect the differences in the likelihood of attrition by experience. 
Studies of teacher attrition have found that salaries and outside teaching opportunities 
have differing impacts on teachers depending on their experience. There is a lower 
probability of experienced teachers exiting the profession than those at the beginning 
of their careers (e.g. Murnane and Olsen 1990; Gilpin, 2011). This explanation leads to 
the conclusion that from a wage-policy perspective raising teacher starting salaries is 
pivotal in increasing teacher quality, while salaries in the subsequent periods of 
teachers’ careers it does not have a decisive impact. 
Nevertheless, the drawing of this inference might be incautious. Our wage data 
concerns the statutory salaries of teachers as well as data of previous studies based on 
OECD data because the OECD has only recently begun to collect data on teachers’ 
actual salaries. In addition to statutory salaries, many countries use schemes that offer 
additional payments or other rewards for teachers. Together with the starting salary, 
these payments may influence teachers’ decisions to enter or remain in the teaching 
profession. Nevertheless, not all countries make additional payments over and above 
the statutory salaries, and the scale of additional payments can vary considerably 
across countries.  
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Figure 1  
Statutory and actual salaries of teachers to salaries of workers with higher 
education, 2014 
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Figure 1 shows the relationship between the statutory salaries of teachers with 15 
years’ experience and the actual salaries of teachers between 25 and 64 to the salaries 
of other employees with a higher education in 2014 for various countries where data 
were available. In some countries statutory and actual) salaries do not differ (e.g. 
Norway, Germany, Slovenia); in other countries, the difference between statutory and 
actual salaries are small (e.g. Great Britain, Belgium, Netherlands) or large (Austria, 
France. Finland). In Finland, for example, relative statutory teacher salaries are not 
very high, but relative actual teacher salaries are the second highest in Europe.  
The difference between actual and statutory salaries may vary according to the 
experience of teachers; older teachers may get more additional payments than younger 
teachers. In such cases, using statutory salaries, we measure the salaries that influence 
teachers’ decisions to enter and exit the profession with different errors by age group. 
Here, the measurement error in teachers’ relative starting salaries is smaller than that 
in the relative salaries of older teachers. These systematic differences in the real relative 
salaries of teachers might influence our results in the question of the effect of teacher 
age-earnings profiles. 
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CONCLUSIONS   
This study investigates how teachers’ relative salaries and the shape of their age-
earning profiles over the preceding 5 years influence students’ internationally 
comparable performance in European countries. Our results show that higher statutory 
teacher salaries and a larger growth in teacher salaries in the first part of teachers’ 
careers increases students’ maths and science performance, while we could not find a 
significant effect on reading performance.   
Teacher salaries may influence teacher quality and thus students’ performance 
through various mechanisms. First, higher wages may have a selection effect at the 
beginning of teachers’ careers, (both in the choice to undertake teacher training in the 
first place, and later in finding employment as a teacher after finishing higher 
education); higher wages may also have an effect on the attrition of teachers. Second, 
higher wages may also have an incentive effect, in as much as higher paid teachers may 
make more effort to increase students’ performance. Although selection and incentive 
effects could not be separated in this study, it seems a reasonable assumption that the 
differences between subjects are the results of the different outside labour market 
opportunities for teachers according to the different subjects taught. The results also 
show that an increase in teachers’ wages lasting five years at the beginning of their 
career may have an immediate positive effect on students’ maths and science 
performance. Nevertheless, based on the available data we cannot drawn conclusions 
as to how wage increases in the second part of teachers’ careers influence students’ 
performance over the same period of time. As discussed in the previous section, the 
apparent lack of a significant effect of teachers’ salaries in the second part of their 
career may be an artefact of the lack of data on teachers’ actual salaries.  
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APPENDIX 
Table A1.  
Countries/waves in the sample 
Austria 2003,2006,2009,2012 
Belgium 2003,2006,2009,2012 
Czech Republic 2003,2006,2009,2012 
Denmark 2003,2006,2009,2012 
Estonia 2006,2009,2012 
Finland 2003,2006,2009,2012 
France 2003,2006,2009,2012 
Germany 2003,2006,2009,2012 
Greece 2003,2006,2009,2012 
Hungary 2003,2006,2009,2012 
Iceland 2003,2006,2009,2012 
Ireland 2003,2006,2009,2012 
Italy 2003,2006,2009,2012 
Luxembourg 2003,2006,2009,2012 
Netherlands 2003,2006,2009,2012 
Norway 2003,2006,2009,2012 
Poland 2003,2006,2009,2012 
Portugal 2003,2006,2009,2012 
Great Britain 2003,2006,2009,2012 
Slovak Republic 2003,2006,2009,2012 
Spain 2003,2006,2009,2012 
Sweden 2003,2006,2009,2012 
Switzerland 2003,2006,2009,2012 
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Table A2.  
Summary statistics 
Variable Mean Standard deviation 
Gender (Male)  0.501  0.499 
Age 15.775  0.290 
Immigrant student  0.072  0.258 
One or both parents 
immigrant 
 0.130 
 
 0.337 
 
Mother’s educational 
attainment less than 
upper secondary 
(ISCED1/2) 
 0.203 
 
 0.402 
 
Mother’s educational 
attainment upper 
secondary (ISCED 3/4) 
 0.396 
 
0.489 
 
Mother’s educational 
attainment tertiary 
(ISCED 5/6) 
0.355 
 
0.479 
 
Father’s educational 
attainment less than 
upper secondary 
(ISCED1/2) 
0.208 
 
0.406 
 
Father’s educational 
attainment upper 
secondary (ISCED 3/4) 
0.380 
 
0.485 
 
Father’s educational 
attainment tertiary 
(ISCED 5/6) 
0.339 
 
0.473 
 
Private school 
0.174 
 
0.379 
 
Proportion of fully 
certified teachers 
0.911 
 
0.912 
 
Teacher shortage at 
school 
0.069  0.941 
School in village 
0.086 
 
0.280 
 
School in small town 
0.241 
 
0.428 
 
School in town 
0.357 
 
0.479 
 
School in city 
0.204 
 
0.403 
 
School in large city 
0.070 
 
0.255 
 
School has responsibility 
for determining salaries 
0.202 
 
0.401 
 
School has responsibility 
for hiring/firing 
0.591 
 
0.492 
 
Proportion of immigrant 
students at school 
0.017 
 
0.030 
 
Proportion of girls at 
school 
0.495 
 
0.161 
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Proportion of women 
teachers 
53.989 8.578 
GDP per capita in 
equivalent US dollars 
(using PPP) 
30299.72 10203.39 
Starting salary as 
proportion of GDP per 
capita 
1.011 .277 
Years to top salary 27.415 9.925 
Growth of salaries from 
starting to 15 years’ 
experience 
1.327 0.154 
Growth of salaries from 
15 years’ experience to top 
1.222 0.155 
CEE country 0.173 0.379 
Year 2003 0.201 0.401 
Year 2006 0.250 0.433 
Year 2009 0.271 0.445 
Year 2012 0.278 0.448 
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Figure A1  
Statutory salaries of teachers as a % of GDP per capita 1999-2013 
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Figure A2 
Age-earnings profile of teachers in the European countries 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012 
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